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The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy: A Review and Assessment 
 
Tiffany Walter
♣
 
 
Introduction 
Scarce natural resources are a constant source of debate, and the allocation of these resources is 
one of the most difficult aspects for stakeholders to agree on. There is a fine line between 
sustainable economic growth and total resource depletion, and sadly in many instances users err 
on the side of resource depletion. Fisheries are a strong example of this, as 28% of world 
fisheries are either over exploited, depleted, or recovering from depletion, and another 52% are 
fully exploited (FAO 2009). Scientifically speaking, it is clear that the only way to save these 
stocks  from  total collapse is to significantly lower,  or cease altogether, fishing in certain 
endangered areas. However, the loss of steady income and a vital food source would be 
devastating to fishing communities, making a complete moratorium on fishing unfathomable 
from the anthropocentric view. It is at this point that fisheries management becomes invaluable. 
Nearly every coastal fishing area has a 
management system in place,  attempting to 
prevent overfishing, while still allowing 
fishermen to make a living. The European Union 
is the world’s second largest fishing power after 
China, and roughly one third of their fish stocks 
will never recover from current overfishing 
trends (Watson 2010).  Despite historically high 
catch amounts in European waters, a formal 
Common Fisheries Policy only came to fruition 
in 1983 after several years of arduous debate, and 
since then has undergone several major 
developments (Europa.eu 2009). This paper will 
discuss the history of the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP), examine the most recent reforms, 
and decide whether or not the policy is effective as it stands today. 
 
Background of European Union Fisheries 
 
In examining the background of EU fisheries, it is important to distinguish that the term 
‘fishery’ indicates a marine or freshwater fish stock that either breeds or congregates in a certain 
area, which is where fishermen tend to catch these resources. There are several large fisheries in 
European waters including herring, anchovy, tuna, sandeels and sprat, to name a few. The top 
EU fishing nations, that comprise more than 50% of all EU landed catch, are Denmark, Spain, 
the United Kingdom, and France (Facts and Figures on the CFP 2008). In the past, the most 
popular type of fishing gear used was trawling (see figure above).  
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This method involves boats towing a large net behind the vessel, dragging along the seafloor 
and catching whatever species are caught in the net. It is highly destructive to benthic habitats, 
effectively destroying coral reefs and other seafloor communities. In addition, it is characterized 
by extraordinarily high levels of by-catch, which are non-target species that become trapped in 
nets, including sea turtles and marine mammals, both of which die without access to oxygen. 
Research is ongoing in developing improvements to trawling gear. Currently in the EU, 82% of 
the fleet ships use non-trawl methods, including long lines, drift nets, and seine nets (Facts and 
Figures on the CFP 2008).  
 
History of the Common Fisheries Policy 
 
The first mention of fishing resources in the European Community is evident in the Treaty of 
Rome, signed in 1957. Article 33 states “The Common Market shall extend to agriculture and 
trade in agricultural products. ‘Agricultural products’ means the product of the soil, of stock 
farming, and of fisheries,” (Symes 1997). The inclusion of fisheries within the Common Market 
made it somewhat easier for EC countries to trade with each other, but the actual fishing rights 
were not attended to until the European Fisheries Convention in 1964. This gathering 
established national sovereignty of coastal states spanning 6 nautical miles from the shore 
baseline, meaning the coastal state had the exclusive right to fish in that area. From 6 – 12 
nautical miles, the coastal state had to share fishing rights with “any fishing vessels which have 
habitually fished in that belt between 1
st January 1953 and 31
st December 1962,” (FAO 1964). 
Essentially, these proceedings gave ownership of fishing rights in territorial seas (0-12 nautical 
miles) to the coastal state. 
Faced with the imminent entry of four new members heavily interested in fishing, the 
EC needed to lay a more rigid structural 
and market framework for these growing 
European fisheries. In 1970, the 
Community drafted  two regulations that 
equated the Common Market and ‘non-
discrimination’ of fisheries to the concept 
of ‘equal access.’ In addition to creating 
the basis for management strategies, these 
Regulations also mandated coastal states to 
allow all other EC states to fish in waters 
within 6-12 nautical miles of their 
coastline. This was done in order to make 
the fishing sector more equal for coastal 
European states with poorly stocked 
coastlines. However in 1983 and 1992 the 
exclusive sovereignty for coastal states 
was changed back to 12 nautical miles, 
leading some to believe policymakers 
simply used it to temporarily restrict equal 
use of all EC states, preserving some sort 
of undefined status quo (Symes 1997).  
In any case, it was painfully 
obvious that European fisheries were in 
need of a comprehensive management 
regime,  especially during the late 1970s, 
after the creation of the 200 nautical mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone, in which  
 
5 
5 
coastal states have the ownership rights of marine resources found within that area. Formal 
negotiations for what would come to be known as the Common Fisheries Policy began in 1976 
(Da Conceicao-Heldt 2006). Based on stock assessment models completed at the time, it was 
known that there needed to be some sort of catch limit for fishers, and the most efficient way to 
allocate numbers was through a quota system. Each fisher is given a total allowable catch 
(TAC) amount for each year. The total quota for each fishery is based on stock assessment 
models done by population biologists and historical track records for each country. TAC 
amounts were at the crux of the CFP debate in 1976, intertwined with the equal access principle 
(Da Conceicao-Heldt 2006).  
At this time, there were only ten member states,  and decisions had to be made 
unanimously (Ginsberg 2007). The first proposal made (which was supported by a majority of 
the members) favored unrestricted access in the EEZ for all member states, and governed by the 
common management of the Commission. Great Britain and Ireland did not support this, as they 
possessed the most fertile coastlines and traditionally did not need to fish in other nation’s 
waters. They wanted a larger portion of TAC amounts for some species, in addition to exclusive 
use of certain areas surrounding their coastlines (Da Conceicao-Heldt 2006). Ireland agreed to a 
compromise given in 1978, but the EC and Great Britain tried endlessly for a compromise, to no 
avail, until 1981 when the Community offered to weaken the equal access principle in British 
waters.  
Once Britain was primed to accept this and effectively end the deadlock, Denmark 
suddenly rejected the entire compromise, on the accusation that Danish fisheries would be 
negatively impacted. After rejecting the subsequent offer for a higher TAC allocation, a 
deadline was imposed by the EC and they threatened to leave Denmark out of the agreement 
altogether if the delegation did not relent. While the intentions of the EC were noble, this threat 
never came to be, as Denmark held the presidency at the time and was able to block the 
agreement from moving forward (Da Conceicao-Heldt 2006). Two years passed and endless 
compromise offers of higher TAC amounts, an increase in Danish fishing licenses, changes in 
conservation methods, and even increased access areas were rejected by Denmark. Finally, in 
January 1983, a right wing party came to power in Denmark and at last agreed to the proposed 
offers; and on January 25
th the Common Fisheries Policy was officially put into place (Da 
Conceicao-Heldt 2006). After this negotiating calamity, the procedure of unanimous voting was 
immediately replaced with a qualified majority system. 
In terms of why the CFP was finally passed, it cannot be ignored that the acceptance of 
Spain and Portugal into the EC was imminent within the next few years. These countries were 
greatly involved in the fishing industry and the Community recognized the need for a fisheries 
management framework at the very least, before these major players complicated the situation 
even further. Once Spain and Portugal joined, the EC fishing capacity was increased by 75% 
(Symes 1997). In an attempt to prevent the Spanish fleet from fishing in Irish waters, a period of 
adjustment was proposed, in which new members would not be able to take advantage of all 
membership benefits, namely equal access, in order to preserve relative stock stability. As part 
of a temporary measure, 70,000 square miles around the coast of Ireland were designated as an 
exclusion zone, called the Irish Box, and Spanish fleets were not able to fish in these waters 
(Symes 1997).  Intense Spanish pressure caused this exclusion zone to be revoked in 1994, but 
several restrictions remained. 
 
1992 Review of the CFP 
 
The review date for the CFP was scheduled for 1992, and with it brought a new host of issues 
and criticisms. The growing environmental movement did not overlook expanding EC fishing 
efforts. Greenpeace began a campaign against industrial Danish fishers, because of the damage 
to the food chain it inflicted by removing an entire level in the form of sandeel, which is a  
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significant food source for larger 
fish such as cod and also 
seabirds, thus depleting their 
overall abundance (Gray 1997). 
Also, the organization protested 
the controversial use of beam 
trawling by Danish ships,  and 
drift nets by French and British 
ships. A beam trawler is different 
than a regular trawl in that the net 
is connected to a heavy beam that 
drags along the floor, 
significantly increasing by-catch 
and benthic area destruction. A 
drift net (see figure above)  is a 
net that is left floating just under the surface for up to 24 hours, and is harmful in the high 
numbers of by-catch it creates; up to 80% of fish caught in some areas area non-target species 
and are subsequently discarded (Gray 1997).  However, these objections by environmental 
groups were met with nothing more than lip service from the Commission, as proposals to ban 
these practices, especially drift nets, did not get past the Council of Fisheries Ministers (Gray 
1997). 
Another controversial issue that the 1992 review had to address was that of a program 
called the Multi-Annual Guidance Program (MAGP). When it was created in 1983, its focus 
was on restructuring the EC fleet, without changing the entire fleet capacity, which is measured 
by a ship’s size and engine power (Boude et al. 2001).  A review of this policy showed that this 
management strategy essentially amounted to too many vessels chasing too few fish, and 
needed to be amended (Boude et al. 2001). The new MAGP IV, enacted in 1997, aims to reduce 
annually the total EC fishing capacity, especially those fishing over exploited stocks by means 
of vessel reduction or days-at-sea reductions, utilizing subsidies for the fishermen to cover some 
of the costs (Europa.eu 2009).  
In addition, beginning in 1992, reviewers found that TAC limits themselves were too 
optimistic. They found that “…overfishing was putting commercial fish stocks under severe 
strain,” (Boude et al. 2001). Despite constant scientific recommendations to lower TACs, 
ministers continually set those percentages much higher than what is sustainable, in order to 
please their constituency, leading to overfishing without actually exceeding TAC amounts. A 
major criticism dealing with this topic is that these important decisions are simply made too 
high up in the EC. The Council of Ministers had an incentive to avoid short term political 
problems and placate fishermen with higher than recommended TACs, when in the long run it 
damaged them more by allowing them to over-exploit the very stock they depend on (Corten 
1996). This disregard for scientific advice led many fisheries biologists to simply stop caring. 
Knowing their advice, backed up with hard evidence, would fall on deaf ears in the Council 
year after year, the scientists focused their talents on other projects. This lead to a subsequent 
fall in research grants due to lack of interest,  and the Advisory Committee on Fisheries 
Management (ACFM) stopped providing management suggestions in 1991 as a result (Corten 
1996). The combination of these unfortunate perspectives led to a poor review of the CFP at the 
time. 
 
CFP Review in 2002 
 
Ten years later, the CFP was up for review yet again, and while initial improvements were 
noted, the prognosis was still bleak for European fisheries. In terms of the MAGP IV fleet  
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tonnage reduction, a decrease of 19,300 gross registered tonnage (Grt) was found between 
1987-2002, and upon further review, between 2002-2007, there was a reduction of 204,315 Grt 
(Villasante 2010).  It  was a welcome surprise that a portion of the CFP was on target and 
achieving its goal. Productivity rates and average catch of EU-13 ships also remained fairly 
constant for the time period of 1990-2006 (Villasante 2010). However, this is not a desirable 
overall trend, as it signifies that a lower number of ships can still catch the same number of fish, 
due to vessel and gear modernization, thus negating the overall goal of the MAGP, which is to 
ultimately reduce fishing pressure. 
  The reforms in 2002 generally focused on granting more responsibility to the Member 
States,  and increasing the rules-based system in an attempt to increase ‘good governance-’ 
principles (Brown 2006). An important tool for implementing this was the creation of Regional 
Advisory Councils (RACs), which govern different areas of European waters, and attempt to act 
as a more efficient pathway to get information from local stakeholders and provide advice for 
the Commission, 
focusing on long term 
sustainability goals 
(Griffin 2010). 
  Enforcement of 
CFP rules even with 
generous TAC limits 
became a significant 
issue, as large amounts of 
catch went unreported, 
and vessels did not 
always comply with ship 
inspections and MAGP 
regulations. The 
Community Fisheries 
Control Agency (CFCA) 
was created in April 2003 
to act as a CFP policing 
force,  whose jurisdiction 
extends over the entire 
EU (Gray et al. 2003). 
This was criticized by 
members of the fishing 
community as being a 
Brussels big-brother tool 
to control their actions 
from afar. However the Commission defended the move by saying that they were “…giving our 
new policy teeth… [for the] effective and uniform monitoring of fishing and uniform penalties,” 
(Gray et al. 2003). These 2002 reforms took the CFP towards a new and necessary direction. 
 
Current State of CFP and Conclusions 
 
The CFP certainly appears to place a great effort on allocating adequate catch limits to the 
Member States, and on systematically restructuring the EU fleet, with many of the reforms since 
1983 focusing heavily on those objectives. However, it is troubling to note the lack of attention 
given to perhaps the largest indicator of the future of the CFP: the state of European fisheries 
themselves. It is clear that overfishing is occurring, as evidenced in lower fisheries production 
(see chart above, Hadjimichael et al. 2010) because of overestimated TAC levels, even after the  
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2002 promise by  the EU to “conserve fish stocks [and] protect the marine environment,” 
(Europa.eu 2009). For example, the cod fishery in the North Sea had reached dangerously low 
levels, and scientists urgently recommended a temporary moratorium on cod fishing in that area 
to allow for the stock to regenerate. Commission advisors decided that an 80% TAC reduction 
would suffice for a recommendation to the Council of Ministers, who eventually agreed on only 
a 45% reduction (Daw et al. 2005), in an attempt to prevent a temporary loss of income for 
fishermen in that region, as  the North Sea cod population is currently near total collapse, 
threatening those same fishermen indefinitely in terms of future incomes. This represents only 
one example of many,  showing how the CFP is negatively affecting European fisheries. 
Another is the use of subsidies within the MAGP, which essentially makes fishing cheaper for 
European fleets. This practice facilitates overfishing and exacerbates the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ that is occurring because of open access in European waters (Markus 2010).  
  There is a large gap between the words of the Common Fisheries Policy and what it 
actually accomplishes in practice. An EU Governance White Paper states that “Policies must be 
effective and timely, delivering what is needed on  the basis of clear objectives [and] an 
evaluation of future impact,” (Griffin 2010). It is clear that the European Union did not 
accomplish its own objectives in its implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy. The EU 
environmental policy is also touted as one of the “most progressive, strongest, and innovative” 
in the world, and sadly it appears that this  reputation does not apply to European marine 
environments (Smith 2005). A thirty year review of the CFP is due in 2012 and hopefully the 
EU will reassess the emphasis, which fisheries biology has in the policy, in order to better 
protect their fishermen. If overfishing continues at the current rate, there will be no future for 
them at all. 
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